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O'Dell: O'Dell: Does Title VII Preclude Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements

Does Title VII Preclude
Enforcement of Compulsory
Arbitration Agreements?
The Ninth Circuit Says Yes
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1974, federal courts have, in different contexts, considered whether Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes enforcement of employment
agreements that compel arbitration of Title VII claims. The statutory language of
Title VII and subsequent amendments to the act providing for arbitration as a means
of resolving disputes have been interpreted inconsistently by federal courts. The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which provides a general mandate to settle disputes
through arbitration, may be applicable to statutory claims, but has been applied
disparately to employment disputes implicating Title VII. The Supreme Court has
twice decided whether employment agreements requiring arbitration of Title VII
claims are enforceable. The holdings of these decisions are inconsistent, which the
Supreme Court has recently recognized, but has failed to resolve. Consequently, the
federal circuits may rely on either of these two cases, and their progeny, in deciding
whether compulsory arbitration agreements are enforceable in accordance with the
FAA mandate or, whether Title VII, and recent amendments, preclude enforcement
of compulsory arbitration agreements.
This casenote examines a Ninth Circuit decision that considered the impact of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the unsettled question of whether Title VII precludes
employers from requiring prospective employees, as a mandatory condition of
employment, to foreclose their right to bring Title VII claims in federal court. The
Ninth Circuit construed the 1991 Act to preclude enforcement of individual
employment agreements that require employees to arbitrate statutory claims brought
under Title VII. The holding of this case establishes a controversial precedent
because it is inconsistent with a seminal Supreme Court decision, the FAA mandate
and other recent federal decisions. This decision, in turn, creates uncertainty as to
Congress's intent regarding the applicability of arbitration to Title VII disputes.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1988, appellant, Tonyja Duffield (Duffield), a securities broker-dealer, sought
employment with respondent, Robertson Stephens & Company (Robertson
Stephens). Robertson Stephens required Duffield to agree to submit to "compulsory

1. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
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arbitration"2 for any future employment-related disputes pursuant to the securities
industry's Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer
(Form U-4).3 Duffield agreed to this condition of employment by signing her Form
4
U-4, and began work for Robertson Stephens as a broker-dealer.
In January, 1995, Duffield brought suit in federal court alleging, inter alia,
sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as modified by
the Civil Rights Act of 199 1. Duffield sought a declaration that securities industry
employees cannot be compelled, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate their
statutory claims brought under Title VII.6 She argued that Congress's intent in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Act's underlying purpose precluded
compulsory arbitration of Title VII employment disputes.' Robertson Stephens
countered that a "plain text" meaning should be given to the statutory language of the
1991 Act consistent with a prior Supreme Court decision' allowing employers to
require compulsory arbitration under Form U-4. 9
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied
Duffield's motion, and granted Robertson Stephen's motion to compel arbitration of
Duffield's employment claims.' 0 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims as a threshold issue." Duffield
renewed her argument that she could not be compelled to waive her statutory right
to litigate her employment dispute claim under Title VII in favor of binding
arbitration. t2 The Ninth Circuit agreed. Reversing the district court, the Court of
Appeals held that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employees entering into
individual employment agreements could not be required, as a mandatory condition
of employment, to foreclose their right to bring statutory suits under Title VII in
favor of binding arbitration. 3

2. For purposes of this casenote, "compulsory arbitration" refers to the system where an employer
requires a prospective employee to agree to surrender their right to litigate any employment disputes in
federal court in favor of binding arbitration in order to obtain employment with that employer. Id. at
1186.
3. Id. at 1185. Paragraph 5 of Form U-4, the arbitration clause, reads as follows:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a
customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws
of the organizations with which I register, as indicated in item 10 as may be amended from time to time.
Id.
4. Id. at 1186.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
9. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90.
10. Id. at 1186.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1185.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When deciding whether employment agreements that require compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims are enforceable, the federal circuits have considered
the relative bargaining power between the employer and employee. The procedural
adequacy of arbitration has also been an important factor in federal decisions. But
these fact-specific considerations have not been dispositive. Rather, federal courts
have decided the issue by endorsing one of two laudable public policies: alternative
dispute resolution, specifically arbitration, which is codified in the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) 4; or eliminating employment discrimination through suits
brought in federal court under Tide VII. In the context of compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims, these policies collide. Without clear direction from the Supreme
Court, the federal circuits have decided the issue by determining which policy should
supersede the other; a decidedly result-oriented approach. Because of their
fundamental importance, a preliminary consideration of these policies is appropriate.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sought, as its primary objective, to
assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and
devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
Congress considered the policy against discrimination to be of the "highest priority,"
which remains Title VII's remedial purpose. 16 To this end, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the act as evincing Congress's intent to invest plenary power in the
federal courts to secure compliance with Title VII.' 7 The Court has stated that "the
federal courts were entrusted with the ultimate enforcement responsibility under Tide
VII. 8 In 1964, at the time of its adoption, the drafters of Title VII did not
contemplate alternative dispute resolution procedures as viable alternatives to enforce
the substantive protections codified in Title VII.
Since then, alternative methods of dispute resolution (ADR), including
arbitration, have become increasingly popular to prevent and resolve disputes. ' The
federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes has steadily gained strength since
its adoption by the Supreme Court in the late 1950's.2° In the 1980's, ADR
proliferated as courts became inundated with protracted litigation that clogged the
formal legal system. Arbitration became the preferred alternative to litigation
because it offered a binding decision without the expense and formality of a
conventional trial.
In deciding whether Tide VII precludes enforcement of compulsory arbitration,
the federal courts have considered the virtues of these policies under different factual
circumstances. Of particular importance has been the type of employment agreement
a party seeks to enforce. Employment agreements generally fall into one of two
categories: (1) collective-bargaining agreements, or (2) individual employment

14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1998).
16. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
17. Id. at 45.
18. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,468 (1982).
19. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 1-7
(abridged ed. 1988).
20. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1999, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 8
[Vol. 1999, No. I
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
contracts. The importance of the distinction, for purposes of compulsory arbitration,
centers on the means of negotiating each type of contract. Collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated between the employer and an association, usually a union,
that represents a large number of employees. The negotiations are conducted on
behalf of employees collectively, which does not afford individual employees an
opportunity to negotiate the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement on
their own behalf. In contrast, an individual employment contract is negotiated
directly between the employer and prospective employee, giving the employee an
opportunity to negotiate specific provisions of the contract, including arbitration
clauses.
In 1974, the Supreme Court first considered whether compulsory arbitration of
employment disputes could be enforced in the context of collective-bargaining
agreements. In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,2 the Court held that prospective
employees could not be forced to arbitrate their employment dispute claims arising
under Title VII pursuant to a provision within a collective-bargaining agreement. 22
The Court found that an employee did not foreclose his right to bring a statutory
action under Title VII in federal court byfirst submitting his claim to arbitration in
accordance with the agreement. 3 The Court intimated that in spite of the federal
policy favoring arbitration of employment disputes, 24 arbitration was not appropriate
as an exclusive forum to redress employment disputes that implicate Title VII
protections. 25 The congressional intent of Title VII was construed to allow an
individual to pursue independently his statutory claims in federal court.26
The Gardner-DenverCourt emphasized the importance of the right to bring Title
VII claims in federal court in the context of collective-bargaining agreements. 27 The
Court reasoned that individual employees, as members of the union, are protected by
the contractual provisions provided in the agreement, but found that these contractual
rights should not operate to foreclose an employee's right to bring a Title VII claim
in federal court. 2' Title VII, the Court concluded, afforded individuals protection
against employment discrimination in addition to contractual protections provided
in a collective-bargaining agreement. 29 Indeed, the Court stated that "the individual's
private right of action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement
of Title VII." 30 In 1974, therefore, compulsory arbitration clauses of collective
bargaining agreements did not preclude employees from bringing Title VII statutory
claims in federal court after such claims were first submitted to arbitration.3'
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver,the growing acceptance
of arbitration in the 1980's pressured the federal courts to reevaluate their reluctance
to enforce employment agreements that required compulsory arbitration. After some

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
Id.
Id.
See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48-49.
Id.
Id.
at 45.
Id.
at 59.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1999/iss1/8

4

O'Dell: O'Dell: Does Title VII Preclude Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements
1999]
Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements
resistance, the federal courts recognized arbitration as a "cheaper, faster, and less
forma" alternative to formal adjudication.32 Accordingly, the Supreme Court began
to enforce pre-dispute agreements under the FAA.33 In Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson
Lane Corporation, the Supreme Court revisited the question of whether compulsory
arbitration agreements are enforceable.34 In Gilmer, however, the Court considered
the question in the context of an individual employment agreement, not a collective
bargaining agreement. This proved to be an important difference the Court relied
upon to distinguish its holding in Gardner-Denver and enforce the compulsory
arbitration provision of a securities registration agreement.35
In Gilmer, the compulsory arbitration provision of the securities industry
registration agreement (Form U-4) was upheld with regard to claims arising under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).36 The employee was
compelled to arbitrate his claim pursuant to an individual employment agreement that
required prospective employees to register as securities representatives with several
stock exchanges.37 The Court found that "[iut is by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA." 8
The Court iterated what it considered to be a "well settled" notion; that arbitration is
a suitable forum to redress employment disputes that implicate statutory protections
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.39 The Court stated that "by agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."'4 The
Court noted that previous cases decided under the FAA found that "having made the
bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue. ' '4 ' This is especially true, the Court found, for individual employment

32. Carla Wong McMillian, Collective BargainingAgreements, Mandatory Arbitration,and Title
VII: Varner v. NationalSupermarkets, Inc., 32 GA. L. REv. 287 (1997); see Martin H. Malin & Robert
F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A JurisprudentialPerspectiveon Labor and Employment Arbitration
from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1993) ("Traditionally, courts
had refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. Recently, however, with the growing popularity of ADR,
courts have abandoned their traditional hostility toward arbitration and openly embraced agreements to
arbitrate.").
33. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amerian Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239-40 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Section 2's mandate covers pre-dispute
arbitration agreements:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
34. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Sole Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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contracts where the individual employee has the opportunity to negotiate her own
contract."' The Court conceded that not all statutory claims may be appropriate for
arbitration, but the burden is upon the employee to demonstrate that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims.43
The Court established the following test that employees must meet in order to
satisfy this burden: "If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of
the ADEA, its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and
the ADEA's underlying purposes." Employing this test the Court found against
petitioner and noted that the ADEA provides that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is encouraged to pursue "informal methods of conciliation,
conference, and persuasion,, 45 evincing Congress's intent to sanction arbitration
within the statutory scheme of the ADEA.4
Arguing for the opposite result, petitioner vigorously asserted that the Court's
decision in Gardner-Denverprecludes arbitration of employment discrimination
claims. 47 The Gilmer Court disagreed and distinguished Gardner-Denverin three
ways. First, the Court noted that Gardner-Denverdid not involve the issue of the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.4 ' Rather, it involved the
issue of whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims.4 9 Second, because the arbitration in that case occurred
in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, it differed from the individual
agreement entered into by the complaining employee. 0 An important concern in
Gardner-Denver that the Court found inapplicable in the context of individual
contracts was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory
rights.5" Finally, the Court noted that those cases were not decided under the FAA,
a statute that reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' 52
Taken together, these differences persuaded the Gilmer Court to uphold individual
employment contracts that required prospective employees to agree to compulsory
arbitration of future employment disputes as a condition of their employment.
Most federal courts have followed the Gilmer Court's endorsement of the FAA.
For example, only months after Gilmer was decided the Sixth Circuit decided Willis
v.Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.53 In Willis, the plaintiff (Willis) brought a sexual
discrimination claim under Title VII. Defendant moved to have this claim arbitrated
pursuant to the Securities Registration Form U-4 Willis signed as a condition of her
employment. In reversing the United States District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that
Gilmer was dispositive of plaintiff's Title VII claim. 4 The Court found that Form

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 27 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1991)).
Id.at 28.
Id.
Id.at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id.at 306-07.
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U-4 employment agreements were enforceable, and that Willis could be compelled
to arbitrate her Title VII claim pursuant to that agreement.
Barely six months after the Supreme Court decided Gilmer,Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991." The Act had two primary goals with regard to Title
VII: (1) "to overrule a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions that represented an
unduly narrow and restrictive reading of Title VII," and (2) "to strengthen Title VII
by making it easier to bring and prove lawsuits, and by increasing the available
judicial remedies so that plaintiffs could be fully compensated for injuries resulting
from discrimination."' Section 118 of the Act, however, included text that explicitly
established arbitration as a viable means of resolving Title VII disputes.5 7 Section
118 provides that: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
of alternative means of dispute resolution,...including arbitration is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this
Title." 3
Since the 1991 Act's adoption, some federal courts have construed the text of
section 118 to evince Congress's intent to endorse compulsory arbitration agreements
in accordance with the FAA mandate. The Third Circuit in Seus v. John Nuveen &
Co., Inc.5 9, upheld Form U-4 under the FAA with respect to claims brought under
both Title VII and the ADEA."° The Court stated: "On its face, the text of section
118 evinces a clear Congressional intent to encourage arbitration of Title VII and
ADEA claims, not to preclude such arbitration." '" Taking the Gilmer holding a step
further the Court found that because Title VII and the ADEA are similar in their aims
and substantive provisions, Title VII was entirely compatible with applying the FAA
to agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims.62 Other federal circuits that have decided
the issue agree with the Third Circuit's contention that the language of section 118
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not impliedly repeal the FAA with respect to
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims.63
Against the backdrop of GardnerDenver, Gilmer, and the text of section 118 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Ninth Circuit considered for the first time the effect
of the 1991 Act on the question of whether individual employment contracts that
require compulsory arbitration of future Title VII claims are enforceable. 6'

55. See supra text accompanying note 8.
56. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190.
57. Pub' L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.)
58. Id.
59. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
60. Id.at 182.
61. Id.
62. Idat 182-83.
63. See Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10-11 (lst Cir.1999).
64. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed the test espoused in Gilmer to
determine whether section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes employers
from enforcing individual contracts that required compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims. The relevant language of section 118 provides for the use of arbitration
"where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law." 5 The task before the court
was to assign meaning to this language in the context of the Act's underlying
purposes; (1) to remedy previous Supreme Court Decisions reading Title VII too
restrictively, and (2) to strengthen Title VII by making it easier to bring and prove
lawsuits, and by expanding available judicial remedies.6
In accordance with Gilmer, the Court required Duffield to show that Congress
intended to preclude compulsory arbitration as a condition of employment through
the Act's text, Congressional intent, or an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and
Title VII's underlying purposes.6 In order to satisfy this test, Duffield argued that
Congress's intent to preclude the compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims is
conclusively demonstrated in the text and/or legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, as well as by an examination of its purposes."
Robertson Stephens argued that a "plain text" reading of section 118, consistent
with Gilmer, not only allows employers to mandate that prospective employees agree
to compulsory arbitration, but that it encourages arbitration of Title VII claims. 9
They contended that because Congress passed the 1991 Act after Gilmer had
"authorized" compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a mandatory condition of
employment under individual employment contracts, Congress intended the language
"and to the extent authorized by law" as an endorsement of the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer.70 Robertson Stephens asserted that they may, therefore, compel
Duffield to submit to compulsory arbitration because she properly agreed to arbitrate
her Title VII employment claim by signing her Form U-4.
At the outset, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to
consider the "plain text" argument that Robertson Stephens made in the context of
an individual agreement that requires as a condition of employment the arbitration
of Title VII claims.7 ' As a matter of construction, the Court stated that Robertson
Stephens' construction of section 118 is at odds with Congress's directive to read
Title VII broadly so as to best effectuate its remedial purposes.7 ' The purpose of the
Act was "uniformly to expand employees' rights and to increase the possible
remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs."73 The Court stated that it would be
paradoxical if the Act, which was to "strengthen existing protections and remedies
available to employees under Title VII," were to "encourage" the use of a process

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
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whereby employers condition employment on their prospective employees'
surrendering their rights to a7judicial
forum for the resolution of all future claims of
4
employment discrimination.
The Court noted, however, that there are two circuit court decisions consistent
with Robertson Stephens' "plain language" construction of section 118 .7"The Court
distinguished both of these decisions, which arose under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA); the first did not involve an employment agreement or a
compulsory waiver, and the second appeared to be a voluntary agreement to arbitrate
consummated at a performance review by a current, not prospective, employee.76
The Court also recognized a third case," which held that under the ADA and Title
VII binding arbitration was enforceable pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements. 7' This decision flatly rejected the holding in Gardner-Denver, which the
Ninth Circuit criticized. The Court found that Gardner-Denver was still79 good law
and, therefore, the Fourth Circuit should not have dismissed its holding.
The Court intimated that reading the language of section 118 in context reveals
the text's ambiguity, and that the term "encouraged" only means that parties are
encouraged to arbitrate within the statutory boundaries Congress contemplated."0
The Court defined these boundaries by qualifying section 118's language with the
Acts underlying purpose."' In the first instance, the Court downplayed section 118
as an "innocuous-appearing section in a statute providing for a vast strengthening of
employees' rights," 2 but recognized that this phrase provides the section's
substantive limitations.83 The Court construed the phrase "where appropriate" to
limit the phrase "to the extent authorized by law," in that Congress did not intend to
encourage all forms of arbitration or to encourage the use of arbitration under all
circumstances that might otherwise be lawful." Rather, the Court found that
Congress intended to encourage arbitration only under circumstances it deemed to
be both legally permissible and appropriate." The meaning of the words "where
appropriate," the Court said, can be gleaned from the purpose and objective of the
1991 Act." "Where appropriate," as used in the Act, "would appear to mean where
arbitration furthers the purpose and objective of the Act--by affording victims of
discrimination an opportunity to present their claims in an alternative forum, a forum
that they find desirable--not by forcing an unwanted forum upon them.""7

74. Id.
75. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 148-50 (1st Cir. 1998); Miller v. Public Storage
Mgmt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1997).
76. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191-92.
77. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-82 (4th Cir. 1996).
78. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1192.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1193.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1191.
83. Id.
84. Id.at 1193.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 1193-94.
87. Id.at 1194. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank,
510 U.S. 86 (1993).
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Likewise, the phrase "to the extent authorized by law" the Court construes as
referring to the Gardner-Denverline of cases prohibiting compulsory arbitration
under Title VII rather than to the Gilmer decision allowing compulsory arbitration
under the ADEA. ss The Court concluded that the congressional intent of section 118
did not include Gilmer within its definition of what was "authorized by law." 9 The
Court stated that "[t]he overwhelming weight of the law at the time Congress drafted
section 118, as it was reported out of the House Education and Labor committee, was
to the effect that compulsory agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims were
unenforceable. In other words, such agreements were not 'authorized by law'." °
The Court employed Gardner-Denver'sview of the purpose of Title VII to inform
what meaning section 118's language, "to the extent authorized by law," should be
given. Specifically, "that the law at that time prohibited employers from compelling
employees to arbitrate Title VII claims pursuant to collective bargaining agreements,
'in large part' because of the Court's recognition of the critical role that Congress
envisioned for the independent federal judiciary in advancing Title VII's societal
goal." 9' The Court, therefore, maintained that Gardner-Denverwas still applicable
law and that it stated the purpose of Title VII under which the language of section
118 should be construed.92
The Court looked to the 1991 Act's legislative history as part of Gilmer's test to
discover whether Title VII does preclude compulsory arbitration of employment
disputes.93 There, the Court found that its reliance on Gardner-Denverwas justified.
The Court concluded that the legislative history of section 118 unambiguously
confirms that Congress sought to codify the law as it stood at the time the section was
drafted, "which would eliminate any possibility that Congress intended to write
Gilmer into Title VII. ' ' 94 The Court found that because the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill," and the congressional statements contained in
the Reports occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer was issued, it
evinces Congress's intent to endorse Gardner-Denverand its progeny, not Gilmer.95
Moreover, the Court emphasized that a proposal which would have allowed
employers to enforce agreements containing compulsory arbitration provisions was

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1194.
Id.; see McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194-95.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1195. The Committee Report states:
The Committee emphasizes that the use of alternative dispute mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus,
for example, the committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of collective bargaining or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking
relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.

Id.
95. Id.
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rejected by Congress during the legislative process.9 Therefore, the Court found the
legislative history of section 118 dispositive in that it contained Congress's view of
the law during the relevant course of enactment, and conclusively evidenced
Congress' intent to codify the holding of Gardner-Denver--that compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims was not "authorized by law." 97
By relying on the reasoning in Gardner-Denverto qualify the language of.
section 118, the Court held that Duffield satisfied the Gilmer preclusion test by
showing that Congress intended to preclude enforcement of individual contracts that
require compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims as a condition of employment.
Accordingly, Duffield's Title VII sexual discrimination claim was found to be
properly before a federal court, and the district court's order compelling arbitration
was reversed.

V. COMMENT
The federal courts have had the difficult task of determining whether Title VII
precludes enforcement of employment agreements requiring compulsory arbitration
of Title VII claims. The inconsistent holdings in Gardner-Denverand Gilmer are
difficult to reconcile even considering that Gardner-Denver was decided in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement, and Gilmer in the context of an
individual employment agreement. A juxtaposition of these cases for current review
leaves courts without a clear statement of the law. The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which strengthened statutory protections under Title VII while endorsing arbitration
"where appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by law," added another dimension
to this already complex question.
The premise upon which the Duffield case rests is that Title VII is unique." The
statutory protections contained in Title VII were created to fulfill an important goal-to end employment discrimination. The Ninth Circuit's holding promotes the
position that these protections should not be subverted in favor of compulsory
arbitration despite arbitration's many advantages. This conclusion follows naturally
from the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver and its progeny, but
contradicts Gilmer, which is mandatory authority in the context of individual
employment agreements like the agreement at issue in Duffield. Extending Gilmer
to apply to Title VII, many federal courts have upheld compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims, opposing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield.
The Duffield opinion, however, is not without support from other federal
decisions that have recently considered the issue. Just three months after the Duffield

96. Id. House Report No. 40(I) provides: The Republican substitute, however, encourages the pursuit
of such mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution." Thus, under the latter proposal employers could
refuses to hire workers unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII
complaints. Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme court decisions, [Gardner-Denver]holding
that workers have the right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve
important statutory and constitutional rights, including opportunity rights. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(1), at
104 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 (Leg. Hist.) (emphasis added).
97. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
98. Id. at 1188.
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decision, the United States District Court, S.D. Ohio considered the question in
O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Board of Education." The Court held, inthe context of
collective bargaining agreements, that Gardner-Denverwas still the law and that the
°
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however, the Ninth Circuit's construction of section 118.
Where other courts have construed the language of section 118 to clearly endorse
the FAA,' the Ninth Circuit found ambiguity. Because the language of section 118,
on its face, appears to clearly endorse arbitration of Title VII claims, the Court's
determination that the language was ambiguous was a crucial, and controversial,
finding that made possible its ultimate holding. This finding allowed the Court, in
accordance with the Gilmer preclusion test, to look beyond the textual language to the
legislative history of section 118. The Court found that Gilmer and its reliance on the
FAA mandate was not adopted by the drafters of section 118. Thus, by implication,
the Duffield Court determined that the FAA is repealed by section 118 with respect
to compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.
Commentary on the 1991 Act challenges this view. Beginning in the early
02
1970's, several Congressional acts provided for arbitration in their statutory text.
These acts ranged from environmental protections to intellectual property law. 0 3
Arbitration of statutory claims brought under these acts was consistently upheld.
Likewise, there is wide support for interpreting section 118 as an endorsement of the
FAA arbitration mandate. Interpreting the language of section 118, one commentator
This interpretation is
noted that "encouragement" connotes "permission."'"
consistent with the majority of federal decisions holding that section 118 expresses
congressional intent to permit resolution of Title VII claims in accordance with the
FAA mandate.'0 5 This view, however, begs the question of why the Duffield Court
was not bound by Gilmer's holding when both Gilmer and Duffield involved
individual employment contracts.
Ironically, the answer lies in the preclusion test espoused in Gilmer. The Gilmer
test allows courts to preclude compulsory arbitration by finding text, intent, or
congressionalpurpose of a statute to prohibit arbitration of claims brought under that
statute. Gilmer'spreclusion test, therefore, grants courts the authority to find that
arbitration may be precluded under that statute regardless of the mandate codified in
the FAA and its own holding. According to the Ninth Circuit, the text of section 118
is ineffectual in furthering or rejecting the liberal policy codified in the FAA because
its ambiguous language does not positively describe the effect of the FAA mandate,
if any, after Gilmer. Clearly, the Ninth Circuit was not satisfied that Congress meant

99. O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d 868 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
100. Id.at 879.
101. Seus, 146 F.3d at 183.
102. Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrabilityin Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for
Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REv. 521, 533 (1994).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 555.
105. Id.; see sources cited supra note 33.
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to endorse the FAA within the language of section 118 without unmistakably clear
language providing as much.
The Ninth Circuit had a result in mind. Specifically, the Court wanted to
promote the purpose of Title VII by protecting employees right to bring Title VII
claims in federal court. The Duffield Court relied heavily on the remedial purpose of
Title VII in order to construe section 118 to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims, thereby satisfying the Gilmer test. The extensive analysis in Duffield is
due, in part, to the complexity of the issue, and that it was a case of first impression
in the Ninth Circuit. But the Court also had to craft an exhaustive argument to justify
circumventing Gilmer and the FAA.
The wisdom of the Duffield holding is dubious when considered in light of the
Gilmer preclusion test that allows federal courts to reach a result that contravenes the
same FAA mandate that the Gilmer Court found dispositive. Curiously, the Ninth
Circuit relied on Gardner-Denverto support its conclusion that section 118 did not
"encourage" arbitration for Title VII employment claims when the Gilmer Court
distinguished Gardner-Denverto find that arbitration was appropriate for claims
arising under the ADEA. The explanation, it seems, is that Gardner-Denveris still
good law, and promotes the policy that the Duffield Court wanted to endorse.
Recently, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation,the Supreme
Court recognized a "tension" between Gardner-Denverand Gilmer.'O Unfortunately,
the Court failed to resolve the tension, leaving the question for a future case because
no waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum had occurred in the collective
bargaining agreement at issue. 10 7 In fact, the Court noted that it followed both Gilmer
and Gardner-Denverin deciding whether statutory claims are subject to compulsory
arbitration, but under different statutes.'0 8 By implication, therefore, the Ninth Circuit
concluded correctly that Gardner-Denverwas still good law, even if its reliance on
that case was suspect under the circumstances of the case before it.
The Supreme Court failed to recognize, however, the "tension" between the FAA
mandate and the Gilmer preclusion test, which was highlighted in Duffield. Gilmer
allows courts, like the Ninth Circuit, to ignore the mandate in order to promote the
policy it chooses, notwithstanding explicit language that appears to provide clear
direction such as section 118. Each circuit, apparently, may rely on the authority that
suits its desired end, which generates conflicting interpretations of federal statutes.
The effect of federal legislation must be consistent throughout the nation. The
Supreme Court should resolve the issue so that each circuit does not determine for
itself which federal policy it will follow where Congress has made that policy
decision. Congress has spoken with regard to arbitration of Title VII claims. The
Supreme Court has only to give effect to the policy federal lawmakers have chosen.
VI. CONCLUSION
If not an extreme case, the Duffield decision is an outlier that subverts the federal
policy supporting arbitration in favor of allowing employee's to bring Title VII

106. 119 S.Ct. 391, 394 (1998).
107. Id. at 394-95.
108. Id. at 394.
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claims in a judicial forum. Until the Supreme conclusively decides the specific
question considered in Duffield, the division over which policy should prevail will
continue.
RYAN D. O'DELL
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